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NOTE

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2481st MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 20 October 1983, at 3.30 p.m.

President: Mr. Abdullah SALAH (Jordan).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Jordan, Malta, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Poland, Togo, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire, Zimbabwe.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2481/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda

2. The situation in Namibia:
   (*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
   (*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
   (*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

The meeting was called to order at 4.10 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Namibia:
(*a*) Letter dated 17 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Senegal to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16048);
(*b*) Letter dated 18 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/16051);
(*c*) Further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia (S/15943)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received letters from the representatives of Angola, Canada, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia and Zambia in which they request to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite those representatives to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Sarré (Senegal) took a place at the Council table; Mr. de Figueiredo (Angola), Mr. Pelletier (Canada), Mr. Roa Kouri (Cuba), Mr. Wolde (Ethiopia), Mr. Krishnan (India), Mr. Treiki (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Mr. Fafowora (Nigeria), Mr. Koroma (Sierra Leone), Mr. von Schirnding (South Africa), Mr. Rupia (United Republic of Tanzania), Mr. Golob (Yugoslavia) and Mr. Lusaka (Zambia) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 19 October from the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, which reads as follows:

> "On behalf of the United Nations Council for Namibia, I have the honour, under rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, to request an invitation to the delegation of the United Nations Council for Namibia, headed by me, to participate in the Security Council's consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia' which begins on 20 October. The other members of the Council's delegation to these forthcoming meetings of the Security Council are: Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria), Mr. Khwaja Wasiuddin (Bangladesh), Mr. A. Coskun Kirca (Turkey), Mr. Feodor Starcević (Yugoslavia) and Ms. Myrna Bradshaw (Guyana)."

3. On previous occasions, the Security Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the delegation of the Council.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Lusaka (President of the United Nations Council for Namibia) and the other members of the delegation took places at the Council table.

4. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I

have received a letter dated 18 October from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which reads as follows:

> "On behalf of the Special Committee, I have the honour to request, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to be invited to participate in the Council's consideration of the situation in Namibia."

5. On previous occasions, the Council has extended invitations to representatives of other United Nations bodies in connection with the consideration of matters on its agenda. In accordance with past practice, therefore, I propose that the Council extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

It was so decided.

6. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I should like to inform the members of the Council that I have received a letter dated 20 October from the representative of Togo, Zaire and Zimbabwe [*S/16055*], which reads as follows:

> "We the undersigned, members of the Security Council, have the honour to request that, during its meetings devoted to consideration of the item entitled 'The situation in Namibia', the Security Council extend an invitation, under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, to Mr. Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of the South West Africa People's Organization."

7. If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Council decides to extend an invitation to Mr. Mueshihange in accordance with rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Mueshihange took a place at the Council table.

8. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The Security Council is meeting today in response to requests from the representative of Senegal in a letter dated 17 October [*S/16048*] and from the representative of India in a letter dated 18 October [*S/16051*] addressed to the President of the Council.

9. The members of the Council have before them document S/15943, which contains a further report of the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia.

10. I should also like to draw the attention of the members of the Council to document S/16050, containing a letter dated 17 October from the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting the text of a decision on the question of Namibia adopted by the Special Committee at its 1248th meeting on 13 October 1983.[1]

11. The first speaker is the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, Mr. Goshe Wolde, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as representative of the current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). I welcome Mr. Wolde and invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

12. Mr. WOLDE (Ethiopia): It is with a deep sense of honour and pleasure that I make this statement to the Council as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and the representative of the current Chairman of the OAU, on an issue to which Africa attaches great importance and with which Ethiopia in particular has a long-standing association.

13. Having said those few words, Sir, I should like to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and to extend to you my best wishes for the successful completion of your term of office. I should, in the same vein, like to express the appreciation of the Ethiopian delegation to the representative of Guyana for the highly admirable manner in which he guided the deliberations of the Council during the very busy month of September.

14. It is a matter of record that, ever since 1946, the question of Namibia, the subject of the Council's deliberations today, has been on the agenda of the General Assembly. Since then, all the major organs of the United Nations have, at one time or another, been seized of the question and countless resolutions have been adopted on it, so that today the independence of the Namibian people is increasingly becoming a litmus test for the effectiveness of the United Nations in general and that of the Security Council in particular.

15. As we all know, the General Assembly has during successive sessions pronounced itself on the developments in Namibia, and in 1966 it terminated South Africa's Mandate over the Territory [*resolution 2145 (XXI)*], setting up the following year a United Nations body to administer the Territory until independence.

16. The International Court of Justice too has on several occasions considered the question, and in 1971 it handed down an important advisory opinion whereby it ruled the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia to be illegal.[2] In this connection, we in Ethiopia feel particular pride at having been associated with efforts at the Court towards upholding the legal authority of the United Nations over Namibia.

17. As the statutory guardian of international peace and security, the Council has also been convened frequently to consider the question of Namibia and even met once on African soil, in our capital city, Addis Ababa. It has, moreover, adopted numerous decisions, among which resolutions 264 (1969), 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) figure

prominently. Yet Namibia remains under South Africa's illegal occupation.

18. However, when in 1978 the Council adopted resolution 435 (1978), there was a widely shared sense of optimism that at long last the day for Namibia's independence was fast approaching. There were, of course, a few of us who were sceptical, doubting both the sincerity of the South African régime and the determination of the members of the so-called Western contact group. As subsequent developments have shown, the sceptics have been proven right. The best efforts of the Secretary-General, the flexibility and statesmanship of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the sole and legitimate representative of the struggling people of Namibia, and the co-operation of the front-line States notwithstanding, it has been impossible to put into operation the United Nations plan as embodied in resolution 435 (1978).

19. We all know the reasons why. Clearly, they are the intransigence and prevarication of the South African régime and the total lack of political will and determination on the part of the Western contact group. Indeed, South Africa not only has effectively blocked the implementation of the United Nations plan but has also used the negotiating process to strengthen its grip over Namibia by establishing illegal institutions and organizing puppet political groups.

20. When South Africa declared during the pre-implementation talks in Geneva that it was not ready to implement the United Nations plan, we believed that the imposition of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations was the most logical course of action. To our deep regret, however, that peaceful course was blocked by the triple veto cast by the three permanent members of the Council who were also members of the contact group.

21. Today that peaceful course is still not only blocked, but with the advent of a new Administration in Washington, the question of Namibia's independence has been rendered more difficult and complex by the infamous strategem of linkage. The question of Namibia is a question of the inalienable and undeniable right of a people to self-determination and independence and, as such, it is an issue of international concern. The presence of Cuban forces in Angola, on the other hand, is a matter falling entirely within the sovereign rights of Angola. To link these two is, I submit, both irrational and irresponsible. Given the fact that the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola is a strategic objective of one particular member of the contact group, we find the linkage self-serving as well.

22. From the latest report of the Secretary-General on the matter [*S/15943*], we gather that, as far as the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) is concerned, virtually all the outstanding issues have been resolved. What appears to block the implementation of the plan is therefore the irrelevant and unjustified precondition of the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.

23. At this juncture, I should like to review very briefly this contrived issue of the Cuban presence in Angola in its historical context and proper perspective. To begin with, we have to ask ourselves why the Cuban forces are in Angola. As we all recall, the presence of Cuban forces was requested by the legitimate Government of Angola, for the clear and express objective of repulsing the open and flagrant invasion by South Africa. Even though the first invasion was repulsed in time by the Angolan people, with the assistance of Cuban troops, we should not forget that South Africa's acts of aggression have continued since then, and that at present the armed forces of Pretoria are in illegal occupation of parts of southern Angola. Hence the continued need for the assistance of Cuban forces, which is in full conformity with Article 51 of the Charter, according to which every State has the right to individual or collective self-defence.

24. The presence of Cuban forces in Angola, therefore, is not only legitimate and legal; it is also a positive element in the continuing struggle for the maintenance of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola. As regards the other States in the region, the presence of Cuban forces in Angola has neither harmed nor threatened their security and stability. Moreover, it has not posed—and indeed cannot pose—a threat to South Africa, a country whose war machine is by far superior to the armed forces of the States in the entire subregion. Furthermore, for the Cuban forces to pose a direct threat to Pretoria, Angola and South Africa must at least share a common border, which they obviously do not.

25. To talk of South Africa's security concern over troops in a country with which it has no common border can as a result only be construed as an acceptance, however tacit, of the occupation by South Africa of the international Territory of Namibia as legal. And to raise this as an international issue, much less link it with the question of Namibia's independence, cannot but also be an open and arrogant interference in the domestic affairs of Angola, in clear contravention of the principles and norms of international law.

26. Our bitter experience with the South African régime and our frustration at the failure of the contact group to assist in the implementation of the plan compel us to wonder—and wonder aloud—whether the question of linkage is not merely one more of the many obstacles that are continually being created to delay the implementation of the United Nations plan. Indeed, we in Ethiopia are convinced that even with the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, the plan will remain a dead letter. We are further convinced that what the strategem of linkage is intended to achieve, and what would probably happen following the withdrawal of Cuban forces, is the invasion and occupation of Angola with the dual aim of overthrowing its legitimate Government and replacing it by traitorous elements subservient to neo-colonial and racist interests and of weakening the liberation struggle of the Namibian people.

27. Fortunately, the international community has clearly perceived this clever but transparent ploy and has, as a

result, taken a clear and unequivocal stand against the attempts to link Namibia's independence with any extraneous and irrelevant issues. In this connection, it is to be recalled that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, at its nineteenth ordinary session at Addis Ababa in June 1983, took an unequivocal position which is set out in paragraph 2 of its special resolution on Namibia.[1] In that resolution, the Assembly, viewing with the utmost concern the attempt to introduce extraneous elements to the United Nations plan for Namibia as contained in resolution 435 (1978), categorically rejected the so-called linkage or parallelism and viewed the insistence on these extraneous elements as undermining the current efforts towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 435 (1978) by holding the freedom and independence of the people of Namibia hostage to the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The Assembly also considered such an insistence as flagrant interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State, the People's Republic of Angola.

28. At the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at New Delhi from 7 to 12 March 1983, the Heads of State or Government "categorically rejected the linkage or parallelism being drawn by the United States Administration between the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola." [*S/15675 and Corr.1 and 2, annex, sect. I, para. 48.*]

29. The International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris from 25 to 29 April 1983, as well as numerous subsidiary organs of the General Assembly—particularly the United Nations Council for Namibia—and, above all, the General Assembly itself, have all rejected this linkage. Indeed, at its thirty-seventh session, the General Assembly in paragraph 3 of its resolution 37/233 B firmly rejected the persistent attempts by the United States of America and South Africa to establish any linkage or parallelism between the independence of Namibia and any extraneous issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and emphasized unequivocally that the persistence of such attempts would only retard the decolonization process in Namibia as well as constitute interference in the internal affairs of Angola.

30. These and other formal pronouncements by individual Governments and international organizations clearly show the emergence of an international consensus rejecting the so-called linkage or parallelism with regard to Namibia's independence. Regrettably, however, an important organ of the United Nations—more particularly the Security Council—has yet to pronounce itself on the matter. To remain silent much longer is but to acquiesce in the delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan. It is also a denial of the central role and unique responsibility of the United Nations in the decolonization of Namibia.

31. By taking an uequivocal stand in rejecting linkage, the Council can surely help remove the artificial obstacle to the implementation of the plan and advance the process of the liberation of Namibia. By so doing, the Council can, furthermore, reassert its responsibility in the matter and enhance its relevance to the maintenance of international peace and security, to which South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia poses a challenge. We therefore strongly urge the Council to reject all attempts to link Namibia's independence with any extraneous and irrelevant issue, such as the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

32. We also urge the Council to establish a time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The just cause of the Namibian people and international legality demand that the implementation of the plan no longer be delayed. If, however, South Africa persists in its dilatory tactics, the Council should seriously consider measures against that régime under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. We have said time and time again that those who fail to heed the law should be brought to suffer its sanction. And so it should be with South Africa.

33. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of India, who wishes to make a statement on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

34. Mr. KRISHNAN (India): Mr. President, I should like first of all to thank you and, through you, the other members of the Council for the courtesy extended to me to address the Council as representative of India and also on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

35. I should also like to begin my statement with the traditional expression of felicitations to you, Sir. We are happy to see a diplomat of your experience and accomplishments presiding over the deliberations of this august body. It is a matter of particular satisfaction to my delegation to find the stewardship of the Council in the able hands of the representative of a friendly and fellow non-aligned country, particularly at a time when the Council is again seized of an issue of very special concern to the Non-Aligned Movement.

36. We meet in this chamber for the second time this year to address ourselves to the question of Namibia. We last met here almost five months ago to deliberate upon this vexed question, which has thus far defied resolution and which continues to pose one of the biggest challenges to the very principles of the United Nations. In these five intervening months, we cannot claim to have come any nearer to an internationally acceptable solution. Meanwhile, the oppressed people of Namibia continue to languish in bondage, looking to the world, and to the United Nations in particular, for deliverance from their ordeal.

37. If there is one lesson we have learned from the bitter experience of the last few years, it is not to harbour optimism or expectation when dealing with the intransigent régime at Pretoria. Be that as it may, one would have hoped that the unanimous adoption by the Council of resolution 532 (1983) on 31 May 1983, following closely on the heels of a debate marked by remarkable restraint and lack of rancour, might signal a turning-point in the efforts

to implement the United Nations plan for Namibian independence. Some were indeed led to believe that this unanimous expression of support from the Council, apart from mandating the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, would set in motion more intensive and resolute efforts by those in a better position to make Pretoria see reason. The situation that currently obtains seems to point to the contrary and yet once again our hopes have been belied.

38. The report of the Secretary-General [*S/15943*] only emphasizes the irony of the present situation. On the one hand, as the Secretary-General informed us, the prolonged and intensive consultations relating to the implementation of Council resolution 435 (1978) have now brought us to a situation where, to use the Secretary-General's own words, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." At the same time, we are informed that, however, "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) still makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*Ibid., paras. 24 and 25.*]

39. How ironic it is that the stage should be set in every way for putting into effect the United Nations plan but that this should be thwarted by considerations which have no relation to, or bearing upon, that plan. And how paradoxical it is that some of those who had themselves played a leading role in the elaboration of the United Nations plan and had committed themselves to securing its implementation should now openly be siding with Pretoria in making its implementation contingent upon the fulfilment of irrelevant and extraneous conditions. My Government cannot accept the distortion of a decolonization problem into one of ideological or East-West confrontation. It would be a travesty of justice to link Namibian independence with unrelated issues like the presence of Cuban forces in Angola.

40. In the course of his statement to the Council on 23 May 1983 [*2437th meeting*], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, speaking also on behalf of over 100 non-aligned countries, set forth in detail the position taken by the Non-Aligned Movement in respect of the Namibian question. It is a well-known position and I need not repeat it here. Nor do I need to dwell on the position of my own country, which was among the first to raise the question at the United Nations, in 1946. Only a few weeks ago, in her address to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India and Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, described the question of Namibia as one which arouses our common indignation. She reaffirmed

> "our total support for the freedom struggle of the people of Namibia, under the leadership of the South West Africa People's Organization, and to the Governments and peoples of the front-line States, which have to endure pressure and provocation."[4]

41. I should also like to bring to the attention of the Council the fact that the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, held from 4 to 7 October 1983, devoted considerable attention to the question of Namibia and pronounced itself in unequivocal terms in this regard. In its final communiqué, the Meeting, *inter alia*, expressed its "strong indignation at the continued non-implementation of the United Nations plan" and categorically rejected

> "persistent attempts by the United States and racist South Africa to obstruct the implementation of the United Nations plan by insisting on 'linkage' and 'parallelism' between the independence of Namibia and extraneous and irrelevant issues, in particular the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola, and unequivocally emphasized that such attempts not only retard the decolonization process for Namibia, but also constitute a reprehensible and gross interference in the internal affairs of Angola." [*S/16035, para. 27.*]

42. At that Meeting, the non-aligned countries also

> "expressed their firm determination to counter all attempts to undermine the central role of the United Nations Security Council in the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and urged the Security Council to assume fully its responsibilities, including taking urgent action to implement its decisions, if necessary by the adoption of enforcement measures against South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter." [*Ibid., para. 29.*]

43. Speaking in the Council last May, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India stated the following:

> "My delegation is convinced that the Council must now stipulate a definite time-frame for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) and remain actively seized of the question until that process is completed. If South Africa continues to defy the Council's decisions, the Council should be prepared to consider appropriate action under Chapter VII of the Charter." [*2439th meeting, para 23.*]

44. I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate that conviction. The time has surely come to force the pace. If South Africa continues to turn a deaf ear to the voice of reason, the United Nations has the moral and legal right, and indeed the obligation, to make it heed the will of the world community. We hope that all the members of the Council will appreciate the limits to forbearance and display the necessary political will to implement the Council's own decision without further delay.

45. Let us not convey to the Namibian people the impression that we have taken them or their patience for granted. Let us also not lose sight or make light of the situation in southern Africa, where a renegade and racist régime continues to be permitted to spread its reign of terror—in Namibia, in the independent African States of the region

and, last but not least, in South Africa itself. The voice of freedom can never be stilled. If we cannot bring freedom, justice and dignity to the people of Namibia and South Africa without further delay, events will surely take their own uncontrolled and bloody course in southern Africa, with disastrous consequences for international peace and security. It is time, therefore, for the Council to act, and act decisively, so that it can vindicate the trust reposed in it and so that Namibians can awaken to the freedom that is their right.

46. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Senegal, who wishes to make a statement in his capacity as Chairman for the month of October of the Group of African States. I call on him now.

47. Mr. SARRÉ (Senegal) (*interpretation from French*): First of all, Mr. President, I wish on behalf of the African Group and on my own behalf to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of October. I am certain that, thanks to your wide diplomatic experience in international affairs, the Council's debates will be crowned with success.

48. I wish also to pay a well-deserved tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Noel Sinclair, the representative of Guyana, who effectively and ably guided the work of the Council last month.

49. Finally, I should like most sincerely to thank you, Mr. President, and the other members of the Council for your kindness in inviting me to address the Council, in my capacity as Chairman of the African Group, during this debate on the question of Namibia, a question which is of great concern both to Africa, which is directly involved, and to the entire international community.

50. The details of the question of Namibia are familiar to everyone, and I shall not dwell on them. For nearly 38 years, indeed, this question has been a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly. It has already been dealt with in several special sessions, international conferences, seminars, round-tables discussions and interminable negotiations. The Council, the guarantor of international peace and security, has devoted several series of meetings to it.

51. There is no need, therefore, to go into the historical background of a problem which is still topical. It would, however, be of interest to recall, for the sake of clarity in the debate, a number of key events, which will help to make it easier to grasp the purport of the case of Namibia.

52. Members will recall that, between 25 and 29 April 1983, the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence was held in Paris, convened in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 37/233 C.

53. During that important Conference, over which my country, Senegal, had the signal honour of presiding, two documents that to our mind embody a crucial stage in the struggle of the people of Namibia to regain their independence were adopted—namely, the Paris Declaration on Namibia and the Programme of Action for Namibia.[5]

54. Beyond the internationally recognized and accepted principles those two documents reaffirm in unequivocal terms, the Conference, as everyone knows, solemnly reiterated the inalienable right of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence in a united and free Namibia in accordance with the purposes and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations.

55. On that occasion, the international community once again most energetically condemned the Pretoria régime for its illegal occupation of Namibia in violation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Council calling upon South Africa to withdraw from Namibian territory and to promote, within the framework of the settlement plan set forth in resolution 435 (1978), the accession to independence of the people of Namibia.

56. As a result of the express recommendation of the Conference, the Council met in May 1983. At that meeting, in which several ministers of Africa and of the Non-Aligned Movement took part, the Council adopted its resolution 532 (1983), by which *inter alia*, it decided to mandate the Secretary-General to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to ensuring the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978). The resolution further requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the results of those consultations not later than 31 August 1983.

57. At this stage I am pleased, on behalf of the Group of African States, to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General for the diligent and responsible manner in which he carried out the mandate entrusted to him by the Council. His report [*S/15943*] reflects the lucidity and concern for clarity and objectivity that characterize him.

58. The following emerges from an analysis of the document: first, the Pretoria régime agrees to Council resolution 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) as a basis for negotiations; secondly, the parties directly concerned, namely, South Africa and SWAPO, are solemnly committed to abiding by the arrangements agreed upon during stages one and two of the negotiations undertaken in 1982 in the context of resolution 435 (1978), without any change of any kind whatsoever; thirdly, that agreement in principle has been reached with regard, on the one hand, to the electoral system, concerning which it remains only to define the type and modalities, and, on the other hand, the composition and status of UNTAG.

59. In sum, all the aspects of a technical and operational nature, including the question of impartiality, leading to implementation of resolution 435 (1978) have been considered and largely agreed upon.

60. However—and this clearly emerges from the Secretary-General's report—South Africa persists in an unacceptable position that we reject: it seeks to link implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and hence the indepen-

dence of Namibia, to requirements that are the purview of the sovereignty of independent States of the region. Furthermore, the Pretoria régime makes this question a prerequisite for any settlement of the problem of Namibia.

61. There is no need to recall that this linkage has been condemned by the international community, during the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in March last at New Delhi, and at the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, held in Paris in April. Better yet, in its special resolution on Namibia,[3] the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, at its nineteenth ordinary session at Addis Ababa in June, categorically rejected that linkage, which it regarded as a serious obstacle to the efforts undertaken to implement resolution 435 (1978).

62. Must we remind everyone that the question of Namibia essentially and fundamentally remains strictly a problem of decolonization that must, if possible, be settled peacefully in the spirit of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples? Must we recall that the question of Namibia is a problem that is still before the United Nations and that it is precisely in this framework that, in accordance with the wishes of the international community and of SWAPO itself, the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia, an appropriate solution must be found?

63. The message that the Group of African States has instructed me to transmit to the Council—and, indirectly, to the contact group—is in the spirit of justice and peace, for which the Council is responsible throughout the world.

64. Africa is patient but not resigned, and while there is still time, it again offers the hand of understanding rather than confrontation.

65. Africa, awaiting the outcome of the work of the Council, urges it, in accordance with the responsibilities conferred upon it by the United Nations, to consider the question of Namibia not only in the light of the initiatives recently taken by the Secretary-General but also in the light of the explosive situation prevailing in Namibia and southern Africa, and hence to exercise all its authority to implement resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978), so that without further delay Namibia, which has suffered so much injustice of every kind, may finally fulfil the legitimate aspirations of its people and join the concert of free and independent nations.

66. Africa expects the Council to adopt appropriate measures to restore to the Namibians their human dignity and thereby enable them, because it is their right to do so, to drink, at last, at the spring of freedom regained.

67. Africa unanimously calls upon the Council to discharge its responsibilities under the Charter effectively and faithfully, in order to redress a flagrant injustice against a people whose only wrong is that it aspires to freedom. In so doing, without a doubt, the Council will spare the continent of Africa and the world at large the risk of a worsening armed conflict that could endanger international peace and security.

68. The Group of African States sincerely hopes that, from the Council's deliberations, will emerge specific measures to enable the Namibian people finally to be independent, the better to devote themselves to the tasks of economic and social development that await them. In so doing, it will have rekindled in us all the faith and credit we attach to the United Nations.

69. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): I now call on Mr. Lusaka, President of the United Nations Council for Namibia.

70. Mr. LUSAKA: Sir, at the outset permit me to congratulate you, in my capacity as President of the United Nations Council for Namibia and on my own behalf, on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for the month of October. We are confident that your eminent qualities as an experienced and skilled diplomat and your wide and varied experience in international affairs will stand us in good stead in our deliberations on the question of Namibia, a question of grave concern to the international community and for the maintenance of international peace and security. The strong support of your country, Jordan, and its people for the legitimate struggle of the Namibian people for national self-determination and independence is a matter of record and needs no elaboration.

71. I wish also to express our appreciation to the representative of Guyana, who during the month of September guided the deliberations of the Council with great skill and success.

72. The Council has been convened once again to consider the question of Namibia in the light of the Secretary-General's further report concerning the implementation of Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*ibid.*].

73. It will be recalled that, pursuant to the call made by the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March 1983, and by the OAU, the Security Council met on the question of Namibia in May 1983 to consider further action to expedite the implementation of its resolution 435 (1978), endorsing the United Nations plan for Namibia's independence.

74. In the course of that debate, in which a large number of delegations were represented at the level of Minister for Foreign Affairs, unanimous expression was given to the need to implement resolution 435 (1978) without qualification, modification or prevarication. Indeed resolution 435 (1978) is the only internationally accepted basis for a peaceful settlement of the Namibian question.

75. It is essential to recall that, during the Council's deliberations on the question of Namibia last May, we spoke in a measured and restrained voice, in the hope that racist

South Africa would perhaps be induced to listen. Unfortunately, its response to the Secretary-General's efforts indicates that it not only has misunderstood our moderation but has also attempted to exploit it.

76. As members of the Council are aware, the Secretary-General, in the exercise of the mandate entrusted to him by resolution 532 (1983) to undertake consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire, with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978), and to report to the Council on the results of those consultations as soon as possible and not later than 31 August 1983, initiated preliminary discussions with the parties to the proposed cease-fire with a view to reaching an agreement on the two remaining outstanding issues relating to the electoral system and the few remaining points pertaining to UNTAG and its composition.

77. It is important to stress here that, during the Security Council's consideration of the situation in Namibia last May, even South Africa's friends acknowledge that those two were the only remaining outstanding issues. Allow me to refer to statements made in that connection by two members of the Western contact group in the course of that debate.

78. At the 2439th meeting of the Council, on 23 May, the representative of the United Kingdom recorded his Government's agreement with the Secretary-General's statement that, as far as the United Nations was concerned, the only outstanding issues were the choice of the electoral system and the settlement of some final problems relating to UNTAG and its composition.

79. Addressing the Council on 25 May, the representative of the United States stated:

> "only two major issues remain to be resolved in preparation for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978). These are: the choice of the electoral system to be employed in the elections . . . and final technical matters concerning the composition of the military component of UNTAG." [*2443rd meeting, para. 186.*]

80. In his further report concerning the implementation of Security Council resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) concerning the question of Namibia [*S/15943*], the Secretary-General stated that, having been assured in the course of his preliminary discussions with South African officials of their Government's acceptance of resolutions 435 (1978) and 532 (1983) as the basis for further discussion and its readiness to discuss the two remaining outstanding issues, he travelled to southern Africa and held talks with, among others, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa, the President of Angola, Mr. dos Santos, and the President of SWAPO, Mr. Nujoma.

81. Assessing his efforts to carry out the mandate given to him by the Council in resolution 532 (1983), the Secretary-General observed in his report that his consultations with the parties to the proposed cease-fire had resulted, as far as UNTAG was concerned, in resolving virtually all the outstanding issues.

82. It should be recalled that the problems relating to the composition of UNTAG have been of South Africa's making. As the Secretary-General's report has made clear, the long-standing support of SWAPO for the Secretary-General's recommendations to the Security Council regarding the military composition of UNTAG was reiterated by the President of SWAPO during their discussions at Luanda last August.

83. As regards the electoral system, we know that SWAPO had for more than a year stressed its position that it was prepared, in principle, to accept either proportional representation or the single-member constituency system, a position which was reaffirmed by Mr. Nujoma during his discussion with the Secretary-General. Furthermore, Mr. Nujoma also urged the imperative need for a decision to be made on this matter as soon as possible and for the establishment of a time-frame for implementation [*ibid., para. 23*].

84. South Africa, on the other hand, has continued to be evasive. According to the Secretary-General's report, the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs indicated to him that South Africa's choice of electoral system "would . . . be made by the Administrator-General and communicated to the Special Representative as soon as a date for implementation had been set" [*ibid., para. 14*]. South Africa's continued refusal to make known its preferred electoral system is yet another dilatory manoeuvre, contrary to the agreement reached by all the parties concerned in New York in July-August 1982 that this issue must be settled in accordance with the terms of Council resolution 435 (1978) and that the issue must not cause delay in the implementation of the United Nations plan.

85. After observing in his concluding remarks that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)", the Secretary-General stated that, however, "the position of South Africa regarding the issue of the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a pre-condition for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) . . . makes it impossible to launch the United Nations plan." [*ibid., paras. 24 and 25.*] Not surprisingly, herein lies the characteristic dishonesty of the racist South African régime. True to form, it appeared to promise co-operation while intending defiance. Once again, racist South Africa unashamedly manoeuvred to exploit the good will and sincere intentions of those who had hoped that *apartheid* South Africa would, for once, show a human face.

86. It continues to be our firm position that the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) has absolutely nothing to do with the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. The international community has rejected with a united voice the so-called linkage policy of South Africa. The Security Council must totally and unequivocally reject the so-called linkage policy of South Africa. The United Nations plan must, therefore, be implemented without further delay.

87. It would be unfair, indeed vulgar, to ask the people of Namibia, who continue to suffer under Pretoria's cruel colonial domination and savage repression, to show still more forbearance and still more patience. For how long are they to continue to bear this ordeal? Nothing that racist South Africa has done gives a modicum of hope. On the contrary, from year to year racist South Africa has devised new strategems to prevent the implementation of the United Nations plan and has flouted the will of the international community.

88. Some three years ago, at Geneva, Pretoria sabotaged the implementation of the United Nations plan by linking Namibia's independence to its spurious charge of United Nations lack of impartiality to oversee the implementation of the plan. Of late, South Africa has refined its stonewalling tactics by insolently linking the inalienable right of the Namibian people to national self-determination and genuine independence to unrelated, extraneous issues, such as the presence of Cuban forces in Angola. One wonders what Pretoria's next pretext will be. What will it link Namibia's independence to? Most likely it will link it to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), to a non-aggression pact or to the question of recognition of the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC). The list is endless. In the meantime, Namibia will continue to be held hostage. The Security Council should not, therefore, create a precedent by linking Namibia's independence to any irrelevant and extraneous issues, especially the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola.

89. Many world leaders have spoken during the current session of the General Assembly of the imperative need to restore the prestige and efficacy of the United Nations. They have warned that the lawlessness and immorality of a few pariah States like South Africa that bedevil the collective search for peace, justice, equality and freedom have ominous consequences. Many far-sighted and responsible personalities have forewarned of a catastrophic war not only engulfing the southern African region, but also spreading its flames well beyond its confines, unless the gross injustices and aggression visited upon the people of Namibia and the region by racist South Africa are brought to an immediate end.

90. Just a few days ago, on 17 October, South Africa once again perpetrated acts of aggression against the sovereign State of Mozambique, demonstrating its insatiable desire for adventurism, in complete disregard of international law. The United Nations Council for Namibia strongly condemns these callous acts of aggression, which threaten international peace and security.

91. If, as many complain, the United Nations has lost its effectiveness, its sense of justice and moral imperative, we have no one to blame but ourselves. It is inconceivable that, for nearly two decades now, *apartheid* South Africa, whose social and political standards are indistinguishable from nazism, has been allowed to make a mockery of our shared sense of justice. Let us not allow ourselves to share in *apartheid* South Africa's burdensome guilt. Let us resolve to have the political will to save the present as well as succeeding generations in southern Africa from the scourges of a catastrophic war. Let us resolve to reassert the authority, efficacy and moral superiority of the United Nations. And let us begin with Namibia, the saddest chapter of our shared history.

92. Let the Security Council, in a united and firm voice, send the message to racist South Africa that the international community will no longer tolerate its unending pretexts intended to prolong its illegal occupation of Namibia and to continue its unprovoked aggression against the neighbouring independent African States. Let the Council unequivocally set a time-frame for South Africa's pronouncement of its preferred electoral system so that the Council may adopt the enabling resolution for the implementation of the United Nations plan. It should be made clear that should South Africa fail to make that pronouncement within that period of time, the Council—in the light of the serious threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa's continued illegal occupation of the Territory of Namibia, its war of repression against the Namibian people, its persistent acts of aggression launched from bases in Namibia against independent African States and its repeated refusal to expedite the implementation of resolutions 435 (1978) and 439 (1978) for the early independence of Namibia—would respond positively to the overwhelming demand of the international community by imposing against South Africa comprehensive mandatory sanctions, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter.

93. To do less is to fail to live up to our collective determination, under the Charter, to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from international law can be maintained, and to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security.

94. Let us act, and act now!

95. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is Mr. Peter Mueshihange, Secretary for Foreign Relations of SWAPO, to whom the Council extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure at the beginning of this meeting. I now call on him to make his statement.

96. Mr. MUESHIHANGE: Mr. President, I should like, first of all, to express my thanks to you and to the other members of the Council for giving our delegation the opportunity to participate in this important debate on the question of Namibia.

97. Permit me also to avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations on your assumption of the high office of President of the Council for the month of October and to convey to one and all in the Council the warm greetings and best wishes of Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, who participated personally in the deliberations of the Council on the very same issue last May.

98. The oppressed people of Namibia and SWAPO, their sole and authentic representative, are looking forward with

keen interest to a successful conclusion of the debate leading to the achievement of freedom and genuine independence of Namibia without further delay. We repose our trust and confidence in you, Sir, reassured by the fact that, under your able guidance and outstanding statesmanship, real and significant progress will be made.

99. I should like at this juncture to express fraternal greetings to and admiration for my brother, Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana, for the outstanding leadership that he provided to the Council during the most trying month of September.

100. It gives me great pleasure, on behalf of the Central Committee of SWAPO, to express our deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to expedite the decolonization process of Namibia and for the close co-operation that we have enjoyed from him. I wish to reassure him that he can count on our continued support and readiness in the expeditious implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

101. Since the conclusion of the Council meetings last May, tension and hot-beds of conflict have continued to increase, thus further endangering the peace and security of the world.

102. Naturally, our primary preoccupation in this regard is southern Africa in general and Namibia in particular. Our region is smouldering under the heat waves of brutal racist repression, colonial domination, generalized State terrorism and various other acts of aggression and destabilization, a litany of heinous crimes for which the *apartheid* régime is solely responsible.

103. I wish to begin my intervention by giving a brief overview of the situation in southern Africa before I deal with the central issue of my statement, namely, the linkage pre-condition being insisted upon by the unholy alliance of *apartheid* South Africa and the current United States Administration.

104. Let me first of all say something about the recently concluded general debate in the General Assembly. It is important to note that this meeting is taking place following that debate in the Assembly. Many Heads of State or Government, ministers for foreign affairs and other high-ranking officials addressed the Assembly on the burning issues of the day. Undoubtedly, one such burning issue is Namibia.

105. It is with delight and appreciation that we recall that the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations have reiterated their unswerving and active support for and solidarity with the embattled people of Namibia and SWAPO, whose military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), has been spearheading the militant national resistance of our people. We are particularly grateful to the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, of which SWAPO is a proud member, the socialist community of nations and other peace-loving and justice-upholding nations for the ongoing, principled and generous assistance to SWAPO and for reiterating collectively and severally their strong demand for liberation, justice and human dignity in favour of our people. Needless to say, this has not only reassured us of the fact that our friends and supporters remain committed in support of our cause but also that they are prepared to continue to render increased all-round assistance to us, which we need now more than ever before to intensify the struggle on all fronts, including in particular the armed struggle, as a matter of the birthright of an oppressed people to liberate its motherland.

106. In this context, I take exceptional pride and comfort in recalling the inspiring and brilliant address delivered in the General Assembly on 30 September by Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Chairman of the front-line States.

107. I can hardly pretend to have a better insight into the complexities of the critical situation in southern Africa than the Chairman of the front-line States. I should, therefore, like to cite a few relevant passages from his important address, which was received with resounding and prolonged applause.

108. At the very beginning of his address, Mr. Nyerere declared:

> "The danger that the freedom struggle in southern Africa will be confused by the East-West power conflict has become greater and more obvious. Namibia is still occupied by South Africa, and the tentative movements towards the isolation of *apartheid* South Africa from the world community which could be discerned during the 1970s are now apparently being reversed. Indeed, far from being forced to the defensive by world pressure, South Africa has been allowed to attack its neighbours with little reaction from the international community. It has received only verbal condemnation—if that—in response to its raids into Mozambique and Lesotho, its destabilization activities in those countries and also in Zimbabwe and Zambia and its innumerable aggressive actions against Angola, culminating in the occupation of part of Angolan territory.
>
> "South Africa's attempts to destabilize its neighbours are intensifying, yet South Africa is treated by many of us as if it were a respectable member of the world community which could be encouraged by constructive engagement into being a good neighbour. And when these countries look for world support, some Members of the United Nations advise that if they would only avoid provoking South Africa they would not suffer from the economic, social and political problems which the South African attacks create for them. The provocation referred to is their open and public opposition to *apartheid* and the reception of refugees from *apartheid* South Africa.
>
> "Unfortunately for South Africa's neighbours, the real provocation they offer is their very existence. The example, especially along its borders, of independent nations which proclaim the equality of man and are

trying to promote human dignity is a continual threat to the *apartheid* régime.

"The choice facing South Africa's neighbours is therefore very clear: either they become accomplices of this racist régime or they must prepare to defend themselves against its attacks. And the United Nations has either to support them in their defence or to become itself an accomplice of the racist State's attacks on its own people and its neighbours. In this context the United Nations means all our States, severally and jointly. Neutrality on racism is immoral and politically unsustainable in the long run"[6].

Concerning Namibia and the implementation of resolution 435 (1978), Mr. Nyerere had this to say:

"Negotiations about implementation have since then dragged on at a snail's pace. South Africa has been constantly stalling and manufacturing new objections to the plan, while the South West Africa People's Organization makes concession after concession in the search for peace.

". . . but South Africa refuses to begin its implementation because Angola has troops from Cuba helping it to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

"I must reiterate once more that Tanzania categorically rejects this attempt to link the independence of Namibia with the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. We know that South Africa has adopted this policy in the last two years on the encouragement of a permanent member of the Security Council. We know that South Africa is remaining stubborn with the encouragement of that State. Tanzania still says that Angola is an independent sovereign State which has suffered from external aggression from the moment of its birth. It has a right to decide for itself on its defence needs. The attempts to link the independence of Namibia with Angola's sovereign decisions has to be rejected by the whole of the United Nations."[7]

109. This eloquent analysis of the ever-deteriorating situation in southern Africa reflects the common concern of all the front-line States and, indeed, of Africa as a whole. In this connection, the special message of the current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State or Government of the OAU, Mr. Mengistu Haile Mariam, Head of State of Ethiopia, which was read out to the Assembly on 11 October by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Goshe Wolde, unequivocally confirms Africa's collective position. It reads, in part:

"It is Africa's view that these acts of aggression and destabilization are designed not only to cripple the armed struggle of the peoples of Namibia and South Africa, but also to overthrow the Governments of the front-line States because of their steadfast and selfless support of the struggle of the oppressed peoples of southern Africa. I submit that this evil design should not be glossed over with more condemnatory and ineffective resolutions. Instead, the international community must assist the front-line States in every way possible in order to enable them to defend better their sovereignty and territorial integrity."[8]

110. Who can forget the concerted efforts being made by the illustrious Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi? In her capacity as the current Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, she made an important and thought-provoking statement at the 9th meeting of the General Assembly and also conducted extremely useful exchanges on the crucial issues of disarmament, development and liberation with other world leaders who, at her initiative, converged on New York during the month of September.

111. The consistent support being rendered to the national liberation movements by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement was further consolidated at the Seventh Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi in March this year, and we are most grateful to the ministers for foreign affairs of the non-aligned countries for once again reiterating their unswerving support for and active solidarity with the struggling peoples of South Africa and Namibia under the leadership of their movements, ANC and SWAPO respectively, as well as for renewing their principled position, which is further confirmation of the fact that the front-line States should be given all the necessary material and financial assistance to defend themselves against racist South Africa's persistent military attacks and other acts of aggression and destabilization.

112. I wish to state once again here that we are greatly indebted to the peoples and Governments of the front-line States, which have been more than generous over the years in their support of our struggle and are still, even today, in the face of untold suffering and the racist terror campaign being daily inflicted on them by the *apartheid* aggressor, prepared to stand firmly behind us, serving as a reliable rear base and a refuge for the Namibian refugees.

113. It is a painful but inescapable fact that the reactionary forces in *apartheid* South Africa and those abroad, who have always stubbornly resisted the forces of change and democracy, will intensify their notorious acts of military pressure, intervention, economic strangulation and sabotage in a sinister attempt to safeguard free access to raw materials and strategic minerals and to maintain geopolitical interests in southern Africa. That means to protect the *status quo*.

114. Certainly, in these circumstances, it is quite obvious that the liberation struggle will continue; the front-line States will use all the means at their disposal in the legitimate exercise of self-defence and they will be justified in inviting friendly countries to give them aid, and other external complications will follow. All this is likely to aggravate further the conflict and tension in southern Africa, threatening the whole region with ghastly consequences.

115. In his latest report, the Secretary-General aptly described this explosive situation as "both highly damaging to the peoples and Governments of the area and also a threat to the wider peace" [*ibid., para. 27*].

116. During the Council's debate in May on the situation in Namibia, the President of SWAPO, Comrade Sam Nujoma, made two substantive interventions dealing not only with the aspirations and expectations of our people for political emancipation, but also, and above all, with the delaying tactics and the intransigence of the Pretoria racist régime as well as the recalcitrance of certain major Western Powers whose policies continue to give encouragement and support to that régime. I therefore have no intention of recounting here the whole sordid history of our struggle.

117. I wish to devote the rest of my statement to the issue I raised earlier—namely, the linkage or parallelism which is today the primary source of unjustifiable catastrophe in the negotiations and the only obstacle to Namibia's full independence.

118. Our careful reading of the Secretary-General's report [*S/15943*], submitted to the Council pursuant to its resolution 532 (1983), has led us to the following conclusions: first, the Secretary-General has successfully carried out his mandate to undertake consultations with SWAPO and racist South Africa with a view to securing the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978); secondly, all the outstanding issues, which were in the first place mere deviations created by the racists and their collaborators as bargaining chips, have been resolved, so that everything strictly in terms of the United Nations plan is now in place; thirdly, those matters that are essentially technical in nature, such as the modalities of implementation, an enabling resolution to be adopted by the Council in order to launch the implementation process, dates for a cease-fire and for the emplacement of UNTAG, including related financial implications, and so forth, would be resolved rapidly within the framework of resolution 435 (1978) and on the basis of the understandings that were reached among the negotiating parties in August 1982 here in New York; fourthly, concerning South Africa's choice of electoral system to be used for elections to the Constituent Assembly—which must be either proportional representation or a single-member-constituency system—we took note of the Secretary-General's confirmation that Pretoria will communicate its choice prior to the Council's adoption of the enabling resolution; and, finally, SWAPO has once again reiterated its readiness to sign a cease-fire agreement and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and his Special Representative in the judicious implementation of the United Nations plan. There is a political will and determination to move forward on our part, and we challenge the Boer régime to do likewise.

119. In other words, as the Secretary-General himself concluded, "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)." [*ibid., para. 24.*]

120. Just to keep faith with our own convictions and to keep the record straight, however, I must state here that, in 1978, when the Council endorsed the United Nations plan in its resolution 435 (1978), all the necessary procedures and requirements for the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations had already been agreed upon after protracted and exhaustive negotiations. Both SWAPO and racist South Africa are on record as having accepted resolution 435 (1978).

121. The pertinent question now is why this particular meeting of the Council is not dealing with the formulation and adoption of an enabling resolution in a more congenial atmosphere, rather than being a forum of antagonism in a hostile atmosphere. Something is wrong here and, indeed, very much so. What is that something, and who are the wrongdoers?

122. What is wrong is the unilateral and unwarranted imposition of this outrageous issue of linkage by the United States on the Namibian negotiations. It is an open secret that it was the Reagan Administration which brought it up in 1981 and has since endeavoured to formalize it through official communications. We see it as part of the rescue operation Washington has launched within the framework of its so-called constructive-engagement policy, which is nothing but a pro-*apartheid* policy with demonstrable hostility towards the interests of millions of black people in the region. Racist South Africa is now conveniently using this outrageous United States policy to buy time while carrying out its diabolical schemes in Namibia and in South Africa itself.

123. This is a very serious development for us. It is also a direct challenge to the authority of the United Nations, which has assumed a unique legal responsibility over Namibia until its independence. This callous display of arrogance of power to which we are being subjected by the United States, which is a permanent member of the Security Council, raises a serious question about the relevance of the Charter of the United Nations as well as about the relevant resolutions of the Council itself and those of the General Assembly with regard to our situation.

124. The record of racist South Africa's non-compliance with the demands of the international community, its defiant behaviour towards the authority of the United Nations and its intransigence and prevarication in the negotiations are well known. All of us have come to expect this from that pariah State of racist admirers of Hitler.

125. Ironically—and perhaps not so ironically—today it is the United States, which otherwise professes commitment to the ideals of fair play, peaceful resolution of conflicts, democracy, the rule of law, human rights and free elections, among others, that is obstructing Namibia's independence and holding to ransom our entire oppressed people struggling for the right to self-determination and freedom in their own motherland.

126. Most regrettably, Namibia's liberation has now been tied to extraneous and irrelevant issues over which we have absolutely no jurisdiction or control—issues, for that matter, with which we have no desire to be involved. Namibia is a clear and straightforward case of decolonization.

It is our people's birthright to be free and to rule themselves, with the co-operation and assistance of peace-loving and justice-upholding mankind.

127. It is quite obviously to us that if the unholy alliance of Washington and Pretoria is going to be allowed to get away with this despicable chicanery, Namibia's hopes for independence will once again have been dashed for many more years to come.

128. Our sources confirm that as far as the top Boer leadership is concerned, especially its military-intelligence-security establishment, the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) is not contemplated for the next two to five years, if at all. It has been demonstrated by many experts that it is the South African military and military intelligence that call the shots, the racist Prime Minister himself being a hard-line warmonger and die-hard reactionary.

129. In the meantime the racists, whose military might and sophisticated weapons-technology are the talk of the town these days in the Western media, will continue to rely on reckless military adventurism and brutal repression inside Namibia and also on intensifying their various acts of aggression against the front-line States and ANC. True to type, the Pretoria racists launched yet another military attack against Mozambique just a few days before the convening of this meeting, in a manner that is supposed to give a warning to those who are committed to end *apartheid* and colonial tyranny. It is my sincere hope that the Council will, at an appropriate time and in a most effective way, add its unanimous voice to the public condemnation of this naked aggression, which underlines the dangerous siege mentality of the Afrikaaner racist minority.

130. Right now, the primary focus of the Pretoria racists is the implementation of the so-called internal constitutional reforms that are nothing but the old trick of "divide and rule" being orchestrated under a new but transparent guise of bogus power-sharing, with a view to divorcing the so-called Coloureds and the Asians from the ranks of the oppressed black population by offering them meaningless representation in a reconstituted Parliament that will always be dominated by the *apartheid* chieftains, further entrenching *apartheid* and excluding the great majority.

131. Therefore, Pretoria could afford, purely for tactical reasons, to create the impression, as part of its public relations offensive, of being flexible regarding the implementation of the United Nations plan. But the fact of the matter is that both Washington, which is now posturing for presidential elections next year, and Pretoria, whose calculations do not countenance a SWAPO victory in Namibia for a very long time to come, have their own hidden agendas, which are clearly at variance with our demands for the implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without any further delay.

132. In Angola, we see a replay of the 1975 nightmare by the racist troops, the Angolan bandits and traitors, mercenaries and other proponents of covert operations who readily provide cash and military aid to these nefarious forces whose aim is to destabilize Angola with the manifest aim of overthrowing the revolutionary Government of the MPLA-Workers Party (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola—Partido de Trabalho).

133. Much has been written since 1975 about Angola and the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and other clandestine activities by the enemies of the Angolan people, who, after waging a long and bitter struggle, freed themselves after more than 500 years of Portuguese brutal tyranny. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Angola, Mr. Paulo Jorge, in his brilliant recent statement at the 27th meeting of the General Assembly exposed the magnitude of the ongoing aggression in his country and offered facts and figures about the cost both in terms of human lives and in terms of property. The Angolan authorities have also prepared a "white paper" which gives more details about the critical situation there, and, thanks to the Permanent Mission of Angola to the United Nations, this document is being disseminated so that the truth may be known.

134. Angola needs practical solidarity, and that solidarity should not be in terms only of firing off exhortations, of repeated expressions of outrage, or of strong condemnations of the *apartheid* terrorists and their imperialist collaborators. What Angola needs above all, are material, financial and humanitarian resources in order more effectively to meet its pressing security, social welfare and economic priorities, which are daily being attacked by those hostile forces.

135. We are grateful to you, Mr. President, and to the other members of the Council for having allowed me to participate in this crucial debate. I have come to plead the case of my people. If I at times sounded less than diplomatic or appeared to be emotionally charged, I assure you, Sir, it was not without cause. For us the situation in Namibia is most alarming: it involves the lives of our people—there are daily murders by the occupying colonial army and the racist trigger-happy police—and the very survival of our people. It is for these reasons that we strongly and unreservedly condemn the United States for holding the independence of Namibia hostage to absolutely alien considerations which Washington is pursuing all over the world for its own ideological and strategic interests.

136. Now is the time for the Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter against racist South Africa. It is our firm conviction that such historic action by the Council, which is the only remaining viable, realistic and peaceful means, will without doubt compel the Pretoria racist régime to co-operate fully in the speedy decolonization of Namibia on the basis of resolution 435 (1978).

137. What our people expect from the Council is a strong and unequivocal rejection of the linkage issue and a condemnation of the Washington-Pretoria unholy alliance that is responsible for it. We represent only a national liberation movement and a colonized people, whose yearning for freedom and daily suffering is the only justification for our struggle. But let there be no mistake about our courage to speak up loud and clear and look straight in the

eyes of those who would dominate us or weaken our resolve and to tell them exactly what is on our minds. For we know that no amount of force or arrogance of power can break the will of a determined people to free itself from foreign domination and colonial oppression. It is this conviction which assures us of the final victory of justice over might and it is this faith which inspires the combatants of PLAN to continue to heighten the pace of the armed struggle until every inch of the motherland is liberated.

138. In conclusion, I wish to register our profound appreciation to the non-aligned caucus and other friends in the Council for their support and good will and for the efforts they are making to ensure that the resolution the Council adopts at the end of the debate will clearly address the major concerns of our people.

139. The most pressing task for the Namibian patriots and the combatants of PLAN is to ensure that we leave no stone unturned as we forge ahead, knowing that the people's struggle will continue until final victory is achieved.

140. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of South Africa. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

141. Mr. von SCHIRNDING (South Africa): May I convey to you, Sir, our sincere congratulations and our best wishes on your assumption of the presidency of the Council.

142. When I last addressed the Council on 23 May this year, I gave a full exposition of the South African Government's position regarding the question of South West Africa and that position remains unchanged.

143. In the meantime, in pursuance of the mandate given to him by the Council by virtue of resolution 532 (1983), the Secretary-General paid visits to South Africa and to South West Africa during August 1983, and the Council has before it his report [*S/15943*].

144. Let me say at the outset that this report accurately reflects the position of the South African Government as conveyed to the Secretary-General during his discussions in Cape Town. I should like to place on record the appreciation of my Government for the objective manner in which the Secretary-General has approached this task.

145. I wish now briefly to restate the South African Government's position on the matters raised during the Secretary-General's visit to South Africa and South West Africa, which are the subject of the report before us.

146. The South African Government remains firmly committed to seeking a peaceful settlement of the South West Africa question on the basis of Council resolution 435 (1978), within the framework of the understandings reached with the United States and the Western contact group. It was in furtherance of that commitment that the South African Government agreed to hold discussions with the Secretary-General in order to attempt to resolve the remaining outstanding issues to be addressed in the context of resolution 435 (1978), namely, the choice of the electoral system and some problems relating to the composition of UNTAG.

147. As the Secretary-General's report confirms, these two issues have now been resolved as far as South Africa is concerned. In addition, certain outstanding matters regarding the agreement on the status of UNTAG were also resolved.

148. The result is that the Secretary-General has been able to report that "we have never before been so close to finality on the modalities of implementing resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid., para. 24*] and that there had been, as he put it, "substantial progress" since the Council last met. I would hope that we shall therefore hear no further irresponsible allegations in the Council that South Africa is somehow responsible for delaying the implementation of a settlement, such as we have already, predictably, heard this afternoon.

149. There is now only one major issue to be resolved and that is the withdrawal of the Cubans from Angola on the understanding that they will not be replaced by any other hostile forces. As is reflected in the Secretary-General's report, the position of the South African Government on this question is that it will not be possible to put into practice any settlement plan unless a clear agreement is reached on Cuban withdrawal. The Government of South Africa is irrevocably committed on this issue. Firm agreement will have to be reached on the fundamental requirements of Cuban withdrawal and a commitment will have to be obtained from the Angolan Government regarding the implementation of such an agreement. And I should add that the South African Government's position on the question of Cuban withdrawal is acknowledged and has support within the international community.

150. The Secretary-General has stated in his report that he does not accept the so-called linkage between a settlement in South West Africa and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. However, in his annual report on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General acknowledged that:

> "Furthermore, when East-West tension is superimposed on regional conflicts and serves to exacerbate them, the already destructive nature of such disputes is likely to be aggravated and the danger of widening strife becomes an ominous prospect."[4]

151. The presence of 30,000 Cuban troops in Angola is not a figment of South Africa's imagination. It is a fact. There is irrefutable evidence that SWAPO and FAPLA (Forças Armadas Populares de Liberasión de Angola) forces are becoming increasingly integrated and the FAPLA forces are advised by Cubans. That is the linkage, and it takes a great deal of wishful thinking to deny that this connection exists.

152. SWAPO operates from Angola with active FAPLA and Cuban support. The relevance of the presence in

Angola of the Cuban forces is therefore indivisible from the efforts to put an end to conflict in the area and to establish long-term peace in the region. It is absurd to deny that the introduction of surrogate forces of the Soviet Union into southern Africa is not a cause for the gravest concern, not only to South Africa and South West Africa, but to all the countries of the region.

153. The members of the Council would surely not deny the commitment of the Soviet Union to world-wide revolution and the imposition of its own ideological system on other peoples and its openly proclaimed policy of supporting hostile action and subversion against South Africa and South West Africa. Its surrogate, Cuba, makes no secret of its efforts to destabilize its neighbours in Latin America and to export revolution wherever it can. Is further evidence necessary of the prohibitive and menacing effect which the Cuban presence in Angola has on the progress towards a peaceful settlement in the region?

154. I should like to reiterate that South Africa has consistently rejected resolutions of the General Assembly which have declared SWAPO to be the "sole and authentic representative of the people of South West Africa". Under no circumstances will South Africa now or in the future receive any representative of the United Nations in South West Africa on that basis. We are aware of the continuing bias in favour of SWAPO on the part of certain United Nations bodies, and I must emphasize once again that no settlement plan can be implemented unless the Secretary-General and his personnel act with strict impartiality. We have taken note of the assurances which the Secretary-General has provided in this connection in his report.

155. The South African Government fully supports the Secretary-General's sentiments that the attainment of a peaceful, prosperous and independent South West Africa would be an achievement of which all members of the international community could be proud. South Africa has given evidence of its willingness to co-operate in the attainment of this worthy goal. It is the baleful and ominous presence of the Soviet surrogate forces in Angola which prevents its realization.

156. Therefore, it would be futile for the Security Council to attempt to set any deadlines or time-frames for implementation until the matter of the Cuban presence in Angola has been resolved, and it should be understood that South Africa would not accept any such deadlines.

157. Finally, reference has been made this afternoon to the pre-emptive operation carried out against a terrorist target at Maputo by a small task-group of the South African Defence Force on 17 October.

158. The South African Government has given adequate warning to the Mozambique Government not to harbour or to grant facilities to terrorists and in so doing permit them to launch and plan attacks and aggression against South Africa.

159. During a tour of the terrorist target in Maputo organized for foreign correspondents by the Mozambican Information Ministry, a Mozambique Government document was discovered by journalists in the rubble of the terrorist headquarters, which was situated in a penthouse and a flat on the fourth floor of a building in Maputo. This document listed two South Africans residing in Maputo as "soldiers" and suggested that such terrorists were known to and aided by the Mozambique Government. Let me quote from the British Broadcasting Corporation's report of 18 October on the discovery of this document:

> "Most of the literature which we saw lying around in the debris was mainly anti-South African propaganda: books on reported left-wing causes, that kind of thing. There was also a bust of Lenin and various personal effects. But we did come across one document which referred to ANC soldiers—and we did question ANC officials about this, and there was considerable embarrassment, both among the officials themselves and among Mozambique security officers who presumably spent all day yesterday going through the office removing any incriminating evidence, if there was any such evidence there. And we questioned them about this reference to ANC soldiers, and first we were told that this referred to political soldiers, but then it was suggested that we ourselves had planted this document while we were walking around the offices."

160. It is from headquarters such as the one destroyed in the pre-emptive raid that acts of terror against civilian targets and the killing and maiming of blacks and whites in South Africa are planned, controlled and supported. The South African Government reiterates its warning that it will seek out and destroy such facilities, wherever they may be.

161. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from Arabic*): The next speaker is the representative of Sierra Leone. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

162. Mr. KOROMA (Sierra Leone): Mr. President, I should like to thank you and the other members of the Council for acceding to my request to be invited to participate in the deliberations on this all-important matter, the question of Namibia.

163. Let me also express my warm congratulations to you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. My country enjoys excellent relations with Jordan, and I should like to assure you of our fullest co-operation as you carry out your onerous responsibilities. In the same vein, my delegation would like to acknowledge and pay a special tribute to Mr. Noel Sinclair of Guyana for the commendable way in which he conducted the affairs of the Council last month.

164. While the United Nations has been seized of the question of Namibia since its inception, it was on 29 September 1978 that the Council, for the first time, put together a package with the concurrence of all the permanent members of the Council, in the form of resolution 435 (1978). The aim of that resolution was to ensure the peaceful transition of Namibia to independence. The United

Nations plan for a settlement of the Namibian situation, approved by that resolution, among other things called for a cease-fire agreement, the creation of a demilitarized zone, the deployment of UNTAG and the holding of free and fair elections under United Nations supervision and control. When that resolution was adopted, the expectation was that, within a period of 18 months at the most, Namibia would achieve its independence. But today, five years later, that resolution has remained unimplemented, and Namibia—a United Nations Territory—is still under the illegal military occupation of South Africa.

165. Most regrettably, immediately following the adoption of that resolution, the South African Government cynically, and in defiance of the decision of the Council, started putting up one artificial obstacle after another, with the intention of frustrating implementation of the resolution and preventing the independence of Namibia.

166. But, even more alarming, and as if to provide succour and encouragement to the South African racists for their defiance of the will of the Council and, indeed, that of the international community as a whole, one of the permanent members of the Council, who had played the role of a *prima donna* in the negotiation and adoption of resolution 435 (1978), introduced matters extraneous to, or non-germane to, the contents of that resolution—to wit, the presence of Cuban internationalist forces in the sovereign and independent State of Angola. The intrusion of such an extraneous matter, or what has come to be known as the "linkage issue", has not only provided South Africa with a further pretext to sabotage the Namibia package but has in fact continued to hold the independence of Namibia and its people hostage to circumstances outside their control.

167. Thus when the United States Government, with the concurrence of the South African régime, insists that the independence of Namibia is contingent upon the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, this is like asking for a mortgage on the people and Territory of Namibia, which they are not in a position to deliver.

168. It is useful at this point to recall the circumstances that gave rise to the diplomatic efforts that resulted in the adoption by the Council of resolution 435 (1978). The African Group, with the overwhelming support of members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and indeed of the socialist countries, affirmed at that time that only effective, comprehensive and economic sanctions would influence the racist régime in Pretoria to relinquish its illegal control of Namibia. It is fair to say that we were lectured to the effect that only peaceful diplomatic efforts could bring about an equitable solution in Namibia.

169. Despite our serious doubts about such an approach, we reluctantly agreed to allow the Western five to undertake appropriate contacts with South Africa. One may ask: What is the pay-off for the moderation and understanding that has been shown by the African States, not even to mention the people of Namibia, during the past five or six years? We all know it to be a fact that Namibia, despite the intervening period, has not advanced towards its independence.

170. Significantly, after so many years we are again being told that we should exercise patience, and what is even more baffling is the assertion that progress is being made towards Namibian independence. Time and time again, when the Council is seized of the question of Namibia, members of the Western Five speak as if independence were around the corner in Namibia. But we know that these soothing expressions cannot be a substitute for the exercise of effective political will with a view to agreeing on comprehensive sanctions, which, in my delegation's view, could alone make the difference as far as the racist régime is concerned.

171. The people of Namibia are certainly not in a position to deliver a mortgage, as has been demanded of them. Angola is a sovereign, independent State, and must, free and unfettered, act in its own national interest as it sees fit.

172. Moreover, as the report of the Secretary-General clearly stated, the "linkage issue" is outside the ambit of resolution 435 (1978), calling for the independence of Namibia. In his excellent report the Secretary-General declared:

> "I have repeatedly made it clear that I do not accept this linkage and that the question of Cuban troops was not envisaged in resolution 435 (1978)" [*ibid., para 25*].

Therefore, the linking of Namibia's independence with the presence of Cuban troops in Angola is a serious travesty of justice, an unjust demand of the people of Namibia and a human tragedy. I again quote the report of the Secretary-General:

> "The people of Namibia . . . are suffering not only denial of their legitimate aspirations for genuine self-determination and independence, but from the effects of procrastination and the uncertainty of their future. . . . I have now witnessed at first hand their impatience and disillusionment." [*ibid., para. 26*]

173. The foregoing position is not oblivious to the need for the lessening of tension in southern Africa. The irony is that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia coupled with the "linkage issue" and the non-implementation of resolution 435 (1978) threatens international peace and security in the whole area, thus leading to instability and conflict in the whole of southern Africa, with South Africa itself carrying out unrelenting armed attacks and acts of aggression against neighbouring States, especially its wilful and criminal occupation of large parts of southern Angola.

174. On the other hand, faced with South Africa's intransigence and its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, SWAPO is left with no alternative but to intensify the armed struggle to liberate the Territory.

175. Again, as the Secretary-General stated in his report:

> "The instability and conflict generated by the failure to resolve this problem have had disastrous results for the neighbouring countries, and especially for Angola. . . . It is both highly damaging to the peoples and

Governments of the area and also a threat to the wider peace." [*ibid., para. 27.*]

176. If peace and stability are to return to that area, resolution 435 (1978) must be implemented unconditionally, and Namibia's independence must not be made contingent upon the withdrawal of Cuban internationalist forces from Angola.

177. We therefore call on the Council to assume its responsibility for the political fate of Namibia, for its decolonization and for its independence. We also call for the speedy and immediate implementation of resolution 435 (1978) without any conditions.

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.

NOTES

[1] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 23*, chap. VIII, sect. B, para. 17.

Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16.

[2] See A/38/312, annex, resolution AHG/Res.105 (XIX).

[3] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 9th meeting, para. 18.

[4] See *Report of the International Conference in Support of the Struggle of the Namibian People for Independence, Paris, 25-29 April 1983* (A/CONF.120/13), part three.

[5] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Plenary Meetings*, 14th meeting, paras. 5-8.

[6] *Ibid.*, paras. 9-11.

[7] *Ibid.*, 27th meeting, para. 85.

[8] *Ibid., Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 1*, p. 1.

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